Introduced in 2008, "At-the-market" (ATM) equity offerings are direct share issuances to secondary market investors. ATMs forgo underwriters and shares are "dribbled-out" over many months. Firms' choices between SEOs and ATMs support the costly certification hypothesis (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). Moreover, firms likely facing high marketing costs (book building) also choose ATMs (Gao and Ritter (2010)), suggesting that their dribble-out nature mitigates the need to fully market the shares. Finally, institutional demand does not explain actual share issuance suggesting retail investors are more important for ATM users.
1 Equity issuance in the U.S. has traditionally followed the firm commitment process (Eckbo, Masulis, Norli (2007) ). Explanations for the dominance of this underwritten offering approach include the certification that investment banks provide to issuers of uncertain quality, as well as liquidity provision and marketing services (Booth and Smith (1986) , Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Gao and Ritter (2010) ). While the needs for and costs of certification, liquidity provision and marketing likely vary among firms, across time, and with the intended use of proceeds, few follow-on equity issues bypassed the underwriting services of an investment bank. However, that changed in 2008 with the introduction of "at-the-market" (ATM) equity issues. amendments to forms S-3 and F-3) opened the door to ATM issuances. These are nonunderwritten share issuances in the secondary market with an additional wrinkle -firms may issue equity via ATMs in a "dribble-out" fashion where they sell the shares in (typically) smaller and variable quantities over three years. The shares are shelf-registered and may be sold without delay; as soon as the firm pulls them off the shelf. Since these issues are sold directly into the secondary market (using a placement agent strictly as a broker) at prevailing market prices, these transactions forego certification and marketing, and rely on the existing stock market demand for the firm's shares. This paper empirically studies ATMs. We are the first comprehensive study of this equity issuance technique, and we offer several lines of inquiry. We begin with a basic description of the anatomy of the market, counter-balanced by a comparison with SEOs over the same period.
We examine the choice between ATM and SEO techniques for equity issuance. We directly test the theory by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) by studying the interaction of asymmetric information and firm quality on the choice of issuance technique (direct -ATM, or underwritten -SEO). We also explore event returns to the two issuance technique samples. And we explore the choice between issuance of ATM vs. SEO in the context of Gao and Ritter (2010) , who emphasize the role of ex-ante demand elasticity for shares in the selection of accelerated vs. fully marketed SEOs. We finish our empirical analysis by describing actual issuance (i.e. dribble-out) activity and examining its common determinants at the firm level.
Our results in brief are as follows. ATMs are an important and increasingly viable equity When we test Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , we focus our attention on factors related to asymmetric information problems and the costs and benefits of certification and liquidity provision. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict that when asymmetric information is high, outside investors rely on underwriter certification to distinguish high quality firms from low quality firms. In such a setting, relatively opaque firms that use underwriters will be revealed as 2 From roughly 1% of the amount of SEO proceeds in 2008 to over 15% in 2013. A significant portion of ATM issuance activity (and SEO activity) involves REITs and regulated firms. When we separate out these firms, the remaining ATMs show an even larger (eight-fold) increase in activity, from $0.5 billion to $4billion from 2008 to 2013. For SEOs, the subset of unregulated corporations issues amounts of $30.7 billion in 2008 and $98 billion in 2013. Therefore, among unregulated firms, ATM use relative to SEO use has also grown significantly over time.
high quality while opaque firms forgoing underwriter services are revealed as low quality. 3 We use analysts' following to proxy for a firm's information environment, and S&P's Primary Equity Ranking to proxy firm quality. The likelihood of a firm using an underwriter (SEO) as opposed to issuing directly (ATM), is increasing in the interactive between asymmetric information and firm quality. In other words, firms' choices between direct and underwritten equity offerings appear to depend on the costs and benefits of certification.
We also explore how demand elasticity for shares influences the choice of ATM versus SEO. Gao and Ritter (2010) argue that firms with ex-ante inelastic demand (and larger SEOs) will benefit more from underwriter marketing efforts. They find that these (more inelastic exante demand) firms are more likely to choose fully marketed (book-built) underwritten offers as opposed to accelerated offers, consistent with marketing flattening the short-run demand curve.
Given ATMs forgo underwriting and marketing, one might expect that ATM issuers face relatively elastic demand for their shares. On the other hand, given ATMs dribble out in small increments over time, ATM issuers may be less concerned with demand elasticity. While both of these arguments suggest reduced need for elasticity of demand, they are for different reasons and therefore carry potentially different empirical implications. The former argument (ex-ante more elastic demand) augurs a positive relationship between ATM likelihood and ex-ante demand elasticity. The latter argument implies that marketing is unnecessary so there could be any relationship between ATM choice and ex-ante demand elasticity. It is therefore an empirical question as to the relationship between ex-ante demand elasticity and choice between ATM or SEO follow-on equity issuance technique.
In our logit of the choice between ATM and SEO, we include Gao and Ritter's (2010) proxy for investor demand elasticity -institutional ownership (lower institutional ownership 3 See section 2 below for a more detailed discussion. proxies less elasticity). We find that ATM issuers have less elastic demand. This is inconsistent with the former of the above two arguments, and therefore suggests the latter of them: the dribble out nature of ATMs alleviates the need to incur marketing costs. This need not imply inconsistency with Gao and Ritter (2010) ; just that marketing benefits in the face of inelastic demand are attenuated by the dribble-out nature of ATMs. In fact, the empirical result (see below) that ATMs are smaller than SEOs supports Gao and Ritter's prediction that larger offerings are more likely to be fully marketed. Overall, the inverse relationship between ATM use and ex-ante institutional ownership suggests a critical role of retail investors as buyers of dribbled-out shares.
Our last set of tests examines the actual issuance (dribble-out) behavior for ATM firms.
These results further highlight the role of retail investors in ATM issuance. They also illustrate the link between market conditions and quantity of shares a firm dribbles out. On the former, institutional ownership changes and institutional net purchasing activity (from ANcerno trading data) do not correspond to issuance activity, suggesting institutions do not take up a significant proportion of the dribbled out shares. On the latter, dribbled out quantities increase in the firm's contemporaneous quarter stock returns and (in some specifications) volatility.
Our research makes several contributions. As the first paper to describe a new follow-on equity issuance technique, it offers a view of equity issuance that is unique to the current environment. The vast preponderance of equity issuance focuses on institutional investors as the setters of initial demand. ATMs appear to be less dependent on institutional investor demand and perhaps more dependent on retail investors instead. This is important for firms that perceive differences in sensitivity of demand to characteristics across investor types. It may also contain important implications for the funding of different types of investments; ATMs may be more efficient funding mechanisms for smaller staged / ongoing investments over an interval. 4 We also provide a unique direct test of the theory by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) .
One potential explanation for the paucity of direct tests of their theory (in the equity issuance literature) is the lack of viable (or popular) equity issuance techniques besides underwriting.
Thus, ATMs are important not only because they're a new offering technique (that is becoming increasingly popular), but also because they provide a viable way to test Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) more directly.
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Our research also speaks to the importance of regulatory policy for firm financing policies. The change in regulations in 2005 (SOR) which allowed for immediate issue of shares off the shelf, opened the door for firms to issue shares under favorable market conditions (a key motive behind dribbling out shares). The 2008 amendments to Form S-3 issuance likely had a hand in broadening the set of issuers using ATMs, also speaking to the importance of regulation for capital acquisition.
Our work also makes contributions in the context of Gao and Ritter (2010) . Their empirical analysis covers 1996-2007, prior to the emergence of ATMs, and indicates that inelastic demand encourages marketing services. Our analysis suggests that ATMs offer an alternative in the face of inelastic demand -dribbling out of shares to retail investors. While this is less appropriate for firms with major upfront capital needs, it may be more tenable for firms that can stage investments over time. 4 Our results below indeed suggest so; R&D investment is more easily staged and it associates with greater likelihood of an ATM.
This is not to say that Chemmanur and Fulghieri is untested. Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) test it in the context of M&A advising. Chemmanur and Yan (2009) test it in the context of product market advertising's link to corporate financing. However, neither these nor other papers provide large sample tests of the choice between direct and underwritten follow-on equity offerings to a broad set of market participants (un-selected, i.e. not pre-existing shareholders that see rights offerings).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the changes in regulation (in 2005 and 2008) , and how they encouraged ATM issuance activity. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on asymmetric information and equity issuance, focusing on the implications developed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) . It also notes the differential importance of demand elasticity for ATMs and SEOs. Section 3 describes our data. In section 4
we study the choice between ATM and SEO issuance techniques and determinants. Section 5 presents event returns and run-ups surrounding both ATMs and SEOs. Section 6 presents information on the actual issuance patterns of ATMs. Section 7 concludes with a particular eye towards future work in the area of ATMs as a viable capital source and its drivers.
Regulatory Reform
The Securities Offering Reform (SOR) policy was promulgated by the SEC on December 1, 2005. There were several broad motives to the reform: to allow more disclosure prior to follow-on equity offerings and to reduce asymmetric information problems that impede capital formation; 6 to define a new category of issuer -a "well-known seasoned issuer" (WKSI); and to provide more timely information to investors without mandating delays in the offering process.
The latter opened the door to offering securities from the shelf very quickly after the firm made a decision to do so. In particular, SOR eliminated the prohibition against immediate takedowns off "delayed shelf registration statements".
However, SOR did not appear to catalyze ATM issuance activity. One possible explanation for this was that eligible firms perceived the value of dribbling out shares as less than the implicit and explicit costs of foregoing the (underwriter) benefits of firm commitment offerings. For large firms, this may be due to limitations on the size of issuance off the shelf, a 6 See Clinton, White and Woidtke (2014) and Shroff, Sun, White and Zhang (2013). concern the SEC specifically noted (Morrison and Foerster (2013) ). For smaller firms, issuing shares off the shelf was still limited due to binding rules on issuer characteristics (Morrison and Foerster (2013) ).
Both of these concerns were addressed in January 2008 with revisions to requirements governing issuance via forms S-3 and F-3. For our purposes, the key revisions encouraging ATM activity broadened the set of companies eligible to issue securities off the shelf, and increased the allowable size of issuances. Regarding the former, the SEC removed the "public float" restriction to defining WKSI ("well known seasoned issuer") companies, as long as the issuers met other eligibility conditions for the use of Form S-3. This had the net effect of allowing companies with less than $75 million in public float to issue via the shelf. Commenters on the SEC's proposed amendments (governing S-3 and F-3 policy) welcomed expansion of the eligibility, noting potential enhancement to smaller companies' access to capital.
The SEC further amended regulations that had previously restricted the value of securities that could be sold in an ATM to 10% of the issuer's aggregate market value of the outstanding voting stock held by non-affiliates. The new policy allows for fully one third of public float to be issued within any 12 month period. This latter change opened the door to larger issues (or more total issuance activity over the course of an ATM program) by qualified firms (WKSIs).
In sum, the 2005 SOR removed wait times for securities issuance off the shelf. The lack of wait-time from decision to execution of issuance is likely important to realization of one of the purported benefits of ATMs -allowing firms to issue shares under "favorable" market conditions. The 2008 changes to forms S-3 and F-3 increased both the breadth of companies eligible to issue securities and the allowed issuance amount relative to the firm's public float.
Given fixed costs to issuance, the increase in allowable issue size allowed firms to amortize that cost over larger (total over time) capital raises. It also likely made ATM issuance more attractive simply because the amount of capital able to be raised became significant. Combined with the wider set of eligible firms, total ATM activity would be expected to rise.
Asymmetric Information, Certification, Marketing, and Equity Offerings
There is a long literature studying asymmetric information, certification and the acquisition of equity capital. Smith (1986) neatly summarizes the early studies and highlights the benefits of investment bank underwriting in the presence of uncertain quality firms, consistent with the theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) . Other empirical work, particularly Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Carter and Manaster (1990) , emphasizes the link between the value of underwriter services and the reputation of the investment bank.
In response to the set of empirical results linking investment bank reputation with the values of corporate securities issued, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) propose a theory that endogenously determines investment bank effort, their reputation, their compensation, the values of securities issued and the choice of issuance method by firms (direct or underwritten). While many of the implications developed already have empirical support, direct tests of independent predictions are lacking. In particular, the implication that firms choose between direct equity offerings or purchase of an investment bank's underwriting services on the basis of the information environment they face and their own firm quality, remains untested with respect to seasoned equity issuance.
We test this implication that a firm's quality and the information environment it faces influence its choice between direct and underwritten equity offerings. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) model investment bank reputation acquisition as a reflection of the dynamic tradeoff in choosing how strict a standard to set when evaluating issuers: It is more costly to set a stricter standard in the short run, but may be more valuable in the long-run by reducing the probability that the bank underwrites a "lemon" and damages its reputation. In assessing this tradeoff banks pay attention to both the information environment and the issuer's quality. When asymmetric information is lower, investors can more easily discern firm quality and the value of an investment bank's certification (and fees earned) will be lower. However, when asymmetric information is higher and investors have difficulty discerning firm quality, underwriter certification is more valuable. In this case, the bank's long-run incentive is to limit its underwriting to what it believes are high quality firms because certifying a "lemon" costs the bank its valuable reputation, depressing the fees it may charge in the future. Thus, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict that the likelihood of an equity offering being underwritten, increases in the interaction between asymmetric information and issuer quality. This is the key implication we test below.
While Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) focus on certification choice, Gao and Ritter (2010) condition on certification (they study SEOs) and focus on whether underwritten offers are either fully marketed or accelerated. The choice of whether to accelerate the SEO is determined by ex-ante share demand curve elasticity. Gao and Ritter (2010) offer four proxies for demand elasticity, but given they all yield similar inferences, we focus on their institutional ownership proxy. This allows us to highlight the apparent difference in marginal investors -institutional for SEOs and retail for ATMs. 7 This is formalized in Chemmanur and Fulghieri's (1994) model as a reduced likelihood that high quality issuers will be pooled with low quality issuers.
When institutional ownership is ex-ante low, demand elasticity is hypothesized to also be low. This implies an opportunity to flatten the demand curve (in the short run) through marketing, encouraging a fully book-built SEO with road show. The alternative (i.e. accelerated offer) involves little marketing and consequently treats the short-run demand for shares as exogenous. While cheaper in terms of explicit underwriter fees (gross spreads), accelerated offers carry potentially greater implicit costs of steeper (than otherwise would be) demand elasticities.
Neither of the above papers considers any real interaction between costly certification and (determinants of) demand elasticity. We do, and this has important implications along two dimensions. First, the greater benefits of marketing (when demand elasticity is low) are more likely to accompany a higher cost of certification. Marketing is aimed at institutional investors and the lower demand elasticity suggests asymmetric information costs are considerable and likely to be larger for lower quality firms. This is precisely where Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict direct, non-underwritten equity offerings because of their costly certification. So while low demand elasticity (low institutional ownership) predicts greater likelihood of a fully marketed SEO (instead of accelerated) due to marketing considerations, it contemporaneously predicts costly certification which discourages an SEO in favor of an ATM. Our empirical work is the first to recognize this tension.
Second, given that underwritten offers are aimed at institutions, prior work on SEOs largely ignores retail investor considerations. To the extent that retail and institutional investors perceive and price risk differently, there is potential segmentation between the markets for ATMs and SEOs. While our analysis of the determinants of ATM dribble-out activity is a first step towards identifying market characteristics that may influence retail investors differently from institutional ones, much work remains. We view the ATM market as a viable setting to (in the future) explore segmentation within common equity claim markets.
Data

ATM and SEO samples
Our study is built around two datasets of follow-on equity issuance: seasoned equity For our hand-collection of ATM data, we use the Knowledge Mosaic platform to search all 8-K and 6-K filings, searching for the following keywords: "at-the-market", "at the market", "controlled equity offering", "sales agency agreement", "distribution agreement". Also, we search for "ordinary brokers" information in 8-Ks and 6-Ks that are non-registration statements (in order to avoid getting all 424B2 through 424B5 filings). We account for any reinstitutions or amendments of earlier ATM programs (we find 12 of them in total).
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Our initial ATMs sample includes 606 closed equity agreements Our ATMs data includes the following fields: name of the issuer, the closing date, the placement status, the planned issuance amount (available for 333 of the total number of 606 ATMs), the closing and current trading symbol, the closing trading platform, SIC code, the issuer's country and state, the closing market capitalization, the market price at closing, the 8 An amendment is considered a revisiting of an initial equity sales agreement whereby the agreement's details change slightly. A reinstitution is a past agreement that is re-activated, usually due to the shelf-registration window expiring. planned use of proceeds, the roster of placement agents together with the agent fees charged.
Finally, we obtain the commitment period within which the issuing company commits itself to dribble-out some or all of the ATM shares.
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All of these ATM specifics are available in Item 1.01 of the respective 8-K/6-K filing. Using factiva.com announcements, we gather the ATMs' announcement dates (we find that only 6 ATMs have announcement dates preceding the closing date).
Our SEOs sample is drawn from the SDC database and includes only common stock offerings in the U.S. Specifically, the filtering criteria we employ are the following (in Requiring CRSP and Compustat data trims our ATMs sample to 281 and our SEO sample to 833 observations. Finally, to facilitate comparisons of ATMs with SEOs, we carve out a subsample of our 281 ATMs: those with no REITs issuers and no regulated and no (other) financial firms (194 observations). We do this to better understand ATM activity by these more 9 The announcement of a commitment period does not place any legal obligation for the issuer.
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Our analysis does not include PIPEs because our focus is on issues to public investors as they likely face different information problems than private ones. Our sample of SEOs includes accelerated SEOs. Bortolotti et al. (2008) and Gao and Ritter (2010) note that these share the key characteristic of underwriting that SEOs have. commonly analyzed types of firms. Confirming evidence of this prediction is seen in 2014 ATM issuance activity. The lack of complete data for these ATMs (we have only the number of deals and planned proceeds) means that we do not include them in our more formal analysis (comparing ATMs with SEOs).
Through the first eleven months of 2014, total ATM programs announced equal 148. Moreover, total planned proceeds are over $20 billion. This is quite similar to 2012. Among unregulated firms, ATMs are showing even stronger growth relative to last year. Thus far, announced proceeds are nearly $7 billion, more than 70% higher than the 2013 total, while SEO activity among unregulated firms has slipped a bit. These numbers strongly suggest the viability of ATMs as a permanent fixture in the US equity issuance landscape.
Descriptive Statistics
In addition to differences between the ATM and SEO "markets", both in terms of structure and growth, there are important differences in the characteristics of ATM and SEO issuers and issues. Table 2 presents a number of issuer (panel A) and issue (panel B) 12 However, much of this was concentrated in a few very large programs ($1.65 billion across three programs and $2.8 billion allocated across nine ATMs). characteristics for our two samples (ATMs and SEOs) and compares them. The variables are listed and defined in Appendix A.
ATM firms are smaller than SEO firms both in terms of market cap and total assets. They also have lower leverage. Consistent with smaller size and leverage, ATM issuers expend more on R&D relative to assets, but the standard proxy for growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) is not statistically different between ATM and SEO firms (3.0 vs. 2.5). ATM firms have lower sales relative to assets and lower EBITDA to assets (negative in fact for ATMs). Consistent with this, they carry more cash relative to assets and burn it more quickly. They have more volatile stock (panel B).
ATM firms' major expenditures (CAPEX/TA and cash acquisition expenditures relative to assets) are significantly smaller than their SEO firms' values. They need more external funds but they also raise larger proceeds relative to market cap (in the median -panel B).
Our key variables of interest explaining ATM/SEO issuance technique choice are the proxies for asymmetric information and firm quality. To measure asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders we use the quantity of analyst coverage. This is lower among ATM firms, suggesting greater asymmetric information for ATM firms compared to SEO firms.
Our proxy for firm quality is Standard and Poor's (S&P) common stock quality ranking. S&P first scores stocks based on growth and stability of both earnings and dividends. They then form rankings of these scores relative to a 'representative' sample of stocks. Del Guercio (1996) finds that banks (which in her sample are more likely subject to prudent man rules) significantly tilt their [delegated] investment portfolios towards high S&P rank (i.e. high quality) stocks.
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Like prior work, we define ranks numerically from a low of 2 (for a score of D) to a high of 9 (for a score of A+). Also following prior work, we set the S&P rank to 1 when missing. Given 13 Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2003) , Badrinath et al. (1989) also use S&P's common stock quality ranking. rankings are not done for non-S&P 500 stocks, this is equivalent to saying that non-S&P 500 firms are systematically of lower quality. We also conduct tests only within the S&P ranked firms to ensure our results are not driven by this convention. Our inferences are unaffected.
We also require institutional holdings data to examine the influence of (ex-ante) share demand elasticity on issuance method choice. We draw data from 13F quarterly filings submitted by institutions with more than $ 100 Million assets under management, available through Thomson Reuters. Our data are collected for the quarter prior to the initialization of the ATM program or the closing of the common stock SEO issuance, respectively. We show that both mean and median values of institutional holdings among ATM firms are significantly lower than among SEO firms.
Finally, we examine trading-related variables for ATM and SEO issues. These are characteristics around the event date.
14 Again, the variables are listed and defined in Appendix A, but here we note a few patterns. Percentage spreads (i.e. relative to stock price) are higher and turnover is lower around ATMs than SEOs. These suggest lower liquidity among ATM firms.
Stock return volatility is higher before ATMs than SEOs, consistent with ATMs being used potentially to exploit market timing options. Fees are apparently lower on ATMs than SEOs.
ATM agent cash fees average 3.1% of planned proceeds (announced amount). The median is 3%. SEO fees are gross spreads and average 4.33% of proceeds. However as we show below, the average firm does not take down the entire filed/announced amount under an ATM. Thus the fee cost per unit share issued is similar for ATMs and SEOs.
Given we follow the convention of setting the S&P rank to 1 for unranked stocks, we explore these firms' characteristics to check the validity of doing so. In panel C of Table 2, we   14 It's important to emphasize here that the event date for ATMs is the announcement date of the program, whereas for SEOs it's the issue date of the shares. According to Clinton, White and Woidtke (2014) and Shroff, Sun, White and Zhang (2013) , SOR changed SEO activity such that the "event" date is likely to be the issue date, after 2005. examine the characteristics for ATMs and SEOs with S&P rankings to those without rankings.
We see that unranked firms are smaller, less levered, have lower institutional holdings and turnover, and higher risk. While quality is admittedly difficult to identify, these differences are consistent with lower S&P rank stocks having characteristics that typically associate with lower quality.
Issuer and Issue Characteristics and the Choice between ATM and SEO
The theory by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predicts that SEO issuance (as opposed to ATM issuance) will be more likely for higher quality firms in higher asymmetric information environments. We test this implication with a logit model of the choice to issue via an ATM or SEO as a function of proxies for asymmetric information and firm quality and the interaction between the two. We use analyst coverage to capture the firm's information environment.
Specifically we define High AI dummy equal to one if there are no analysts covering the issuer in the month preceding the announcement/issue of the ATM/SEO and zero otherwise. As an alternative measure of asymmetric information we construct Continuous AI which equals 1/(1+number of unique analyst estimates) in the month preceding the announcement/issue. More analyst coverage proxies for lower information asymmetries. In addition, the evidence in Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) suggests that the information content of an additional analyst is decreasing in the number of pre-existing analysts covering the firm. Thus, the declining marginal impact of an additional estimate (built into our ratio) is appealing. To measure firm quality we use Standard and Poor's (S&P) common stock quality ranking, as discussed above. A complete list of variables is listed in Appendix A.
We present our logit results in Table 3 . There are six columns of results, three for each asymmetric information proxy. The dependent variable equals one if the firm does an ATM and equals zero for an SEO. Our general specification follows: y = α + δX + β1*AI + β2*Quality + β3*AI*Quality + ε where X is the matrix of controls (in the appendix) and AI is the proxy for asymmetric information. The key coefficient is β3. Recall that under Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , underwritten offers are more likely among opaque firms of higher quality. We proxy for asymmetric information with either the High AI dummy or Continuous AI so higher values will imply greater information asymmetry. We use S&P equity ranking to measure firm quality.
Since the product is more positive among higher quality higher asymmetric information firms (who are expected to use an underwriter), we expect β3<0.
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Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline results where we only include the asymmetric information and quality measures stand-alone (i.e. without their interaction and without controls). We find a significantly positive coefficient on the High AI dummy in column 1 and on Continuous AI in column 4, suggesting the probability of using an ATM increases in firms degree of asymmetric information, if we don't recognize the interactive effect of quality with asymmetric information in the cost of certification. Also in columns 1 and 4, the coefficient on the quality measure is negative, suggesting higher quality firms tend to use SEOs.
We next examine the interaction of these two measures. Columns 2 and 4 add the interaction term and show the coefficient β3 is significantly negative in both cases. Specifications
Rather than report coefficient estimates, we report marginal effects (the change in the probability due to a one unit change in the variable of interest evaluated at the mean probability).
3 and 6 add additional control variables and also report β3 is significantly negative.
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These negative coefficients on the interaction of our proxies for asymmetric information and quality indicate that SEOs are more likely to be used by high quality/high asymmetric information firms.
These firms presumably have the most to gain from certification, consistent with the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) .
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Also consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), the coefficient β1 (on stand-alone AI) is notably larger when we include the interactive (β3) than when we don't. The inclusion of β3 causes β1 to measure the effect of higher asymmetric information on ATM/SEO choice for the low quality firms. This is precisely the place where Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict firms will choose direct offerings because certification is too costly. The much more positive β1 is consistent with this.
Turning to the marketing hypothesis of Gao and Ritter (2010) , we use Total institutional holdings to proxy for institutional demand. Presuming that demand elasticity increases in institutional holdings, we would expect a positive coefficient on this variable if such firms could more easily sell shares directly, as in an ATM. It is also possible, however, that the ATM's dribble-out feature alleviates the need for marketing given that issuance can be spread out over months or even years. Moreover, given underwriter efforts are concentrated in garnering institutional demand, firms with less institutional ownership may be particularly challenging to market, making it prohibitively expensive. Consistent with this latter conjecture, we find the probability of an ATM is decreasing in institutional holdings.
16 Ai and Norton (2003) show that the coefficient on an interaction terms in logit models can be misleading. Following their proposed solution we confirm that marginal effects of the interaction of quality and AI are negative (see Appendix B for details).
Given the large fraction of firms lacking an S&P ranking, we rerun the tests in Table 3 excluding firms with missing S&P ranks. This smaller sample still results in significant results. Namely, for the specifications corresponding to columns 5 and 6 we find the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
There are only three other significant control variables. We see a negative coefficient on Tobin's Q, suggesting more growth opportunities encourage an SEO as opposed to ATM. Firms with more growth opportunities may need more capital in general. Indeed, our other significant control -Proceeds -confirms that greater proceeds associate with more likely use of an SEO.
Finally, larger run-up associates with greater likelihood of an SEO as opposed to ATM. This is consistent with our returns analysis presented below.
The logit results are consistent with the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) . Higher quality firms in higher asymmetric information environments find the underwriting and certification of investment banks to be sufficiently valuable to encourage them over direct equity offerings (ATMs). They are also consistent with firms selecting issuance methods on the basis of benefits to dribbling out shares rather than issuing a single large block of them.
Event Returns and Run-up
This section explores event returns as well as returns leading up to the event (run-ups). The events we study for ATMs are the announcements of the issue plan. Announcement dates for ATMs are the 8-K statement dates, which are required filings for ATMs. We cannot observe the exact "take-down" dates (i.e. issuance dates) as they are not reported (even ex-post). In section 6, we explore take-down activity for ATMs. We obtain quarterly take-down information from 10Qs. For SEOs the event is the actual issue date, rather than the announcement date (see Clinton, White and Woidtke (2014) and footnote 16 above). Table 4 , panel A provides measures of event returns using both the market model and simple market-adjusted returns.
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The sample is all non-regulated, non-REIT firms conducting either ATMs or SEOs in our sample period. Both ATMs and SEOs show negative marketadjusted event returns (-2.7% and -3.5% respectively).
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The average SEO event return is significantly different from that for the ATMs at the 5% level. However, given the above evidence that firms select the issuance method based on costly certification and marketing considerations (Table 3 ), the significant difference in event returns does not imply that the method of issuance is the reason for the difference.
As a first step to investigating underpinnings of abnormal event returns, we estimate stock price run-ups prior to the events. As Ritter (2003) summarizes, there is a negative correlation between prior stock price performance and SEO event returns, so it is natural to inquire whether similar patterns exist for ATMs. Moreover, characteristics important in selection of issuance approach may simultaneously influence returns prior to the event. We therefore examine stock returns in the month and year prior to both ATM and SEO events. We find that they're dramatically different. Table IV , Panel B presents our results.
We calculate run-up as the cumulation of daily market-adjusted returns over various windows preceding the ATM and SEO events. The windows we analyze are [-252, -30] and [-30, -3] . SEO run-ups are respectively 30% and 9%. By comparison ATM run-ups are about half as large, 15% and 5.5%. Both are significantly smaller than their SEO counterparts. Overall, SEOs show stronger performance prior to the event than ATMs. 18 We discuss only the market-adjusted returns for brevity, and also because the differences in run-up between ATMs and SEOs (see below) imply differences in market model intercept estimates that would affect measured abnormal returns.
In un-tabulated results SEO announcement returns are significantly negative with average market-adjusted returns of -1.56%.
We can interpret the difference in run-up in several ways. First, firms conducting ATMs have a timing option that SEO issuers do not. The ATM announcement does not require issuance immediately, so run-up need not be so large as to make it costly to eschew issuance now. An ATM firm may wait until the stock rises further to issue and take advantage of a higher price.
Second, even if the firm issues under an ATM and then observes a further run-up in stock price, it still has the option to issue again and take advantage of that further rise in price. Overall, the timing option affords ATM firms the ability to announce and even execute issues after smaller run-ups than in the case of SEOs.
While the above assumes a market-timing element to the firm's decision, smaller run-up may associate with ATM issuance regardless of active timing. For example, an alternative interpretation is that run-up results from the market perceiving new investment opportunities for SEO firms to a greater degree than for ATM firms. Indeed, the negative relationship between Tobin's q and ATM (vs. SEO) incidence is consistent with this. Such a situation may arise if a shock to investment opportunity occurs that requires a large scale immediate investment. This would result in a large stock price response to the shock (run-up) and a likely SEO. If ATMs associate with more ongoing investment, like meeting working capital needs, continuing R&D, etc., then perhaps a lower run-up is expected.
Actual Issuance Behavior in ATM Programs
Given ATMs' flexibility to be executed in a dribble-out fashion, we investigate firms' actual issuance behavior under their ATM programs. We collect data on firms' issuance of equity under the ATM program from their 10-Q filings (or 10-k in the case of the fiscal year end filing). The 10-Q provides aggregated (across all of the firm's issues in the quarter) information on actual issuance activity. The sample is comprised of all ATMs that we are able to find price data for (from CRSP). We do not restrict our attention to non-regulated firm ATMs because there is no need (ability) to compare dribble-out activity of ATMs with a similar construct for SEOs.
The above comparisons to SEOs encourage focus on the subsample of non-regulated firms because that is a tradition of SEO studies.
Univariate Statistics
We focus on two firm-level measures of actual issuance activity. Actual cumulative issuance equals the total number of shares actually issued during the ATM program, divided by the announced number of shares that the firm planned to issue under the ATM program. Actual issuance duration equals the number of quarters it took the firm to complete the actual issuance of shares under the ATM (this variable is only calculated for the sub-sample of firms that complete the announced planned issuance amount). For this variable, even if a firm did not issue shares during a particular quarter during its ATM program, we count that quarter as long as it occurs before the ATM is completed.
We also present two measures of "price efficiency" of the actual issuance. We scale the firm's reported "weighted average actual issuance price" 20 by two different measures of market price; the end-of-quarter price and the average (time-series) quarter's price (using daily closing prices). The former measure may be viewed as the benefit of doing an ATM relative to an SEO executed strictly on the last day of the quarter. While not all firms would choose to do an SEO at the end of the quarter, it is one possible view of the snapshot that would occur on any particular day of the quarter. The latter measure may be viewed as the benefit/cost of picking various days/times to dribble-out (perhaps on the basis of firm expectations that it's a favorable 20 The average price issued at, across all dribble-outs that quarter, weighted by shares issued at each day's price. moment), relative to a rather uninformed approach of dribbling out an equal amount each day of the quarter. 21 Table 5 presents means, medians and standard deviations of the above variables, across various samples. For the full sample of firms (in Panel A), average actual issuance is slightly less than a half of the announced plan size (42% in the mean), while the median firm issues less than a third (28%). There is substantial variation in execution across firms (41% standard deviation).
The typical firm is apparently unwilling to issue the full amount of announced ATM planned shares, and often takes down substantially less than even half the announced amount. Confirming evidence is seen in the fact that less than one third (105 out of 383) take down the full planned announced amount.
Also in Panel A we see that the average actual issuance price is below the average endof-quarter price by 7% across all ATMs. Relative to one feasible issue price (that would occur on a single day in an SEO), the ATM issuance process yields a less favorable pricing for the firm. This is apparently driven by a few observations where placement timing choice significantly underperforms, since the median of issue price relative to end-of-quarter price equals 1. The final row of Panel A admits to other days within the quarter that the firm might issue. Compared to the average daily stock price during the quarter, the average issuance price obtained on ATM dribbling out is slightly inferior, with a mean (across firms) of 0.95 and a median of 0.98. A simple splitting of issuance across each day in the quarter would yield better pricing. This is consistent with the prior literature on repurchases of stock, which suggests that managers lack timing ability.
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This latter methodology mirrors recent work in the stock repurchase literature. See Bonaimé, Hankins and Jordan (2014) and Dittmar and Field (2014) for details. Both papers compare reported average price paid during a buyback, with an average stock price smoothed over a time window. Panels B and C report actual issuance statistics for (respectively) subsamples of firms that announced their ATM prior to or after the start of calendar year 2011. Given the increasing use of ATMs through time, we split at the beginning of 2011 to create two equal length windows of analysis that potentially differ by popularity of the issuance technique. The latter window may show more active dribbling out.
As it turns out, ATMs announced prior to 2011 show higher actual cumulative issuance in the mean and median. However, it is interesting to note the shorter duration to completion among the later window ATMs, with full actual issuance of the announced number of shares. In other words, conditional on completing the issuance of the announced number of planned shares, the more aggressive issuers are from the later sample rather than the earlier sample. On the other hand, there are more ATM users in the later part of the sample period that fail to "complete" the issuance program. Table 5 focuses further on time-series patterns of dribble-out. We report the actual cumulative issuance values by various quarter windows following the announcement. In other words, we investigate dribble-out "aggressiveness" over time. The other noteworthy part of Panel D is the focus on the role of institutions in ATMs. Our analysis conditions on the availability of (13F) institutional ownership data from Thompson Reuters, and we show net institutional trading (purchasing minus selling) activity by quarter. Finally, we assess the correlation between net institutional trading and actual share dribble-out. In short, we ask whether institutions systematically buy more in dribble-out months.
Panel D of
The first row of Panel D reports cross-sectional averages of actual cumulative issuance over various length windows following the ATM announcement [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 12 quarters] .
The means suggest an apparent preference to accomplish significant actual issuance in the first two quarters (nearly 25% of the announced planned issuance amount), followed by less activity over the second half of the year (about 5% of the announced). The second year continues to show less activity (5% of the announced), compared to the first year. This general downward trend presents in our regression results next.
By contrast, the (cross-sectional) medians suggest something of a hump-shape: more aggressive dribble-out in the second half of year one (8% of announced) compared to the first half of year one (4% of announced). Nevertheless, the decline in issuance activity during the second year continues to present. Overall, firms' issuance is more concentrated in the first year following announcement of the ATM program. ATM announcements appear to anticipate equity capital needs within the coming year, more so than in the subsequent year.
We next explore how ATM issuance corresponds to institutional demand. As we saw in Table 3 , ATM's are more likely when ex-ante institutional holdings are lower. We now take an ex-post look at the relation between actual issuance (dribble-out) activity under the ATM, and institutional ownership demand. To measure institutional demand for ATM firm shares following the announcement, we collect data on both institutional purchases and sales (of a firm's shares) over a quarter, from the ANcerno database. We calculate net purchasing by each institution as purchase of a firm's shares minus sale of that same firm's shares. Then we aggregate this net across all institutions that trade in the firm's shares that quarter. The result is net institutional buying (per ATM firm per quarter).
We present cross-sectional averages (and medians) of net institutional buying in row 3 (4) of Panel D. At first blush, the net institutional buying figures suggest little demand by institutions for the shares that ATM firms dribble out in the quarter. The average and median levels of net institutional buying are not very large numbers in absolute value (less than half of a million shares) in each period. On the other hand, we mostly see net buying in the first two years (with the exception of quarter 7) and then net selling in the third year after ATM announcement.
Given that ATMs imply issuance of shares into the market and much of that issuance activity occurs in the first two years following announcement, perhaps net institutional buying represents takeup of the ATM shares specifically by institutions.
To distinguish between these two interpretations, we refer to rows 5 and 6 of Panel D.
Here we scale net institutional buying in a quarter by the announced amount of shares to be issued under the ATM program. The (cross-sectional) average of this ratio is very close to zero in every quarter (only quarter 3 shows net buying equal to 5% of the announced planned ATM issuance). The medians are all less than 1%. Given issuance percentages that exceed 1% through much of the first two years following ATM announcement, it appears that institutions are not the target audience for such shares.
Finally, we estimate the Pearson correlation between net institutional buying relative to announced (planned) ATM issuance amounts, and the ATM firm's actual issuance (dribble-out) relative to planned ATM issuance. We do this treating each ATM firm/quarter as an independent observation. The correlation is -0.02 with a p-value of 0.55, clearly not different from zero.
Again, we conclude that institutions are not meaningful buyers of ATM firms' dribbled-out shares.
Overall, our results suggest that ATMs do not depend on institutional demand and may in fact be motivated by a lack of institutional demand. In the context of Gao and Ritter (2010) , ATMs may be an alternative to accelerated SEOs and fully marketed SEOs. Specifically, issuers who simultaneously face inelastic institutional demand and prohibitive underwriting and/or marketing costs turn to ATMs. Additionally, ATM issuers may have better retail investor demand.
Multivariate regressions
Numerous factors may influence firms' preferences to execute actual issuances in ATM programs. In Table 6 we investigate the influence of time, prior actual issuance activity, stock volatility, and stock returns on dribble-out activity. Given that we treat each quarter of potential actual issuance by a firm as a separate observation, there are 899 firm/quarter observations in our regression, despite only 383 firms with actual issuance information.
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Also, given the highly censored nature of actual issuance activity 23 we use a censored quantile regression (CQR). 24 We estimate the CQR centering on the 75 th quantile because doing so causes the predicted value of the dependent variable to be .1020. We therefore have more variation on the left-hand side of the distribution, enhancing our specification.
We find several interesting results. Generally speaking, the following factors correlate significantly with firms' dribble-out behavior: how far along the firm is in the ATM program, both from a time standpoint and a quantity issued standpoint; stock return volatility in the quarter of dribble-out; firm stock return during the quarter of dribble-out; and whether the firm committed publicly (in the announcement) to a time period for the ATM program. Most of these effects are intuitive. The farther along a firm is (time-wise) in the ATM program, the less it dribbles out in the current quarter, consistent with more aggressive issuance earlier in the program. The higher is stock volatility in a quarter, the more a firm dribbles out. This is 22 While this suggests a small average number of quarters per firm, recall that nearly half of the ATM programs in our sample (through 2013) actually were announced in 2013. Given that we only collect dribble-out data through December 31, 2013, many of our observations will have limited data available. We also stop collecting dribble-out information upon completion of a firm's ATM program, and we require sufficient data to calculate our regressors.
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Nearly 60% of our firm/quarters have zero dribble-out executed.
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A Tobit regression also handles censored data; however, our data on actual repurchases fails to satisfy the normality and homoscedasticity assumptions of the Tobit. consistent with practitioner statements that firms believe they have timing ability and the timing option is more valuable when there is more volatility. We see higher dribble-out during quarters of higher (abnormal -market model based) stock returns, consistent with firms' attempts to time their issuance. 25 Finally, our lone counter-intuitive result is that more prior actual issuance (dribble-out) correlates with more issuance in the current quarter. This is perhaps due to the hump-shaped issuance activity pattern documented in Panel D of Table 5 .
The other noteworthy patterns are across specifications that differ by the quantile on which we center the distribution of our dependent variable. The choice of centering quantile affects the influence of observations near that quantile relative to those further away. Thus, as we move from column 1 to columns 2, 3, and 4, the coefficients are more affected by observations with larger dribble-out activity. The patterns of coefficients indicate the following: In the larger (compared to smaller) dribble-out firm quarters, there is more tension between the two indicators of a firm's progress through its ATM program. Firms farther along (time-wise) in their program dribble-out less, but those that have issued more up to this point, dribble-out more. We also see that the two higher quantiles of dribble-out firm/quarters have significantly higher correlation between dribble-out quantity and stock return volatility. The timing option appears to be most important to those firms that are very active issuers in this quarter. These same firms (high dribble-out firm/quarter obs) also pay much more attention to the level of stock returns this period. Overall, our CQR results suggest that market characteristics are important determinants of firms' dribble-out decisions on a quarterly basis.
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But we must acknowledge the possibility that the returns were higher after the dribble-out, but during the same quarter.
Conclusions
We study the anatomy of a new approach to offering equity. At-the-market (ATM) offerings came into fashion starting in 2008, driven by regulatory changes that made such offerings feasible. Since then, they have grown significantly to comprise a meaningful portion of the follow-on equity issuance market.
We contrast ATMs with SEOs as they are both follow-on issuances but differ by certification and possibly by (market) liquidity needs. To anchor our analysis of the choice between issuance approaches, we test the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) . Under it, high asymmetric information firms that are also higher quality will choose an SEO because the benefits of certification outweigh the costs. Our empirical analysis supports this conclusion. The advent of a new direct-to-market follow-on equity offering approach allows us to empirically examine the theoretical influence of asymmetric information and firm quality on firm financial behavior.
We also study wealth effects associated with both ATMs and SEOs. ATMs appear to show less negative announcement returns when compared with event returns for SEOs, but this result is likely due to selection. Moreover, ATM firms show less run-up pre-event than SEOs. Under Ritter's (2003) observation of a negative correlation between run-up and announcement returns, this offers an alternative explanation for the differences in event returns.
When we explore the relationship between ex-ante institutional ownership and issuance method choice, we find that ATM issuers have less elastic demand. This is consistent with the dribble-out nature of ATMs alleviating the need to incur marketing costs. Also, the inverse relationship between ATM use and ex-ante institutional ownership suggests a critical role of retail investors as buyers of dribbled-out shares.
Finally, we examine firms' actual issuance behavior in their ATM programs. We find several interesting results. Firms appear to use the timing option to dribble-out shares when market conditions are favorable. They dribble-out more when stock return volatility is higher and also when contemporaneous quarter returns are higher. Overall, we believe the ATM issuance approach is an important part of the equity issuance landscape, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Many avenues for future research remain. We have not yet analyzed whether the variation in planned use of proceeds is important. Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2010) find that this is an important sorting variable among SEOs. Perhaps firms use ATMs to accomplish different objectives depending on the planned use of proceeds (operational, investment or financial). Too, the purported benefit of flexibility to raise equity capital under favorable market conditions begs the question of whether firms can effectively identify such conditions. While we offer preliminary evidence inconsistent with this form of market timing, perhaps future research will be able to pinpoint the days on which firms (their agents) actually executed their issuances.
We might then correlate these with market microstructure measures of market conditions.
Continuous AI
1/(1+number of analyst estimates) in the month preceding ATM/SEO announcement/issuance. More analyst coverage proxies for lower information asymmetry.
Run-up
The stock's daily cumulative market-adjusted return over the window [-252,-3] .
CARs (event CARs)
The stock's market model daily cumulative abnormal returns [-1,+1] , where 0 is the event day. The market model parameter estimation window is trading days [-252,-16] .
MARs
The stock's market adjusted daily cumulative returns [-1,+1] where 0 is the event day. The CRSP equally-weighted index is the market proxy.
Total institutional holdings Total institutional holdings as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Data are from 13F filings submitted to the SEC by institutions with more than $100 million assets under management. Institutional holdings are available from Thomson Reuters and are reported on a quarterly basis.
S&P primary equity ranking
Standard and Poor's (S&P) current quality ranking valuation on stock performance. The earnings quality variable ranks the firm's quality from 'A+' through 'D', with 'A+' being the highest. We recode the equity ranking variable to be a numerically ordered variable from 9 to 2. Basic scores are computed separately for earnings and dividends and then each are adjusted by a set of predetermined modifiers for changes in the rate of growth, stability within long-term trends and cyclicality. Adjusted scores for earnings and dividends are then combined to yield a final ranking.
Actual cumulative issuance Actual cumulative issuance equals the total number of shares actually issued up to this point in the ATM program, divided by the announced number of shares that the firm planned to issue under the ATM program.
Actual issuance duration Actual issuance duration equals the number of quarters it took the firm to complete the actual issuance of shares under the ATM program. This variable is only calculated for the sub-sample of firms that complete the announced planned issuance amount.
Actual incremental issuanceActual incremental issuance equals the number of shares issued (as part of the current ATM program) during this quarter, divided by the announced number of shares that the firm planned to issue under the ATM program.
Quarter counter
Quarter counter is the number of quarters that have passed since the ATM announcement.
Prior actual cum. issuance Is the value of actual cumulative issuance, as of the previous quarter end.
Stock return volatility
Stock return volatility is the contemporaneous quarter's standard deviation of daily stock returns.
Prior quarter CAR
Prior quarter CARs are the cumulative abnormal return (marketmodel based) over the quarter preceding the actual cumulative issuance measure's quarter.
Current quarter CARs
Current quarter CARs are the cumulative abnormal returns (market-model based) over the same quarter as the actual cumulative issuance quarter.
Commitment dummy
Commitment_dummy is equal to one if the firm announces a commitment period for issuance (rather than allowing it to expire at the end of the three-year shelf registration period), zero otherwise.
APPENDIX B
Appendix B presents the variation of the coefficient on the interaction of either the High AI dummy or the Continuous AI with the S&P primary equity ranking value. Figure 1 (2, 3, 4) refers to the information asymmetry and the firm quality interaction term drawn from regression model 2 (3, 5, 6) . Each figure shows the interaction effect as a function of the predicted probability of the dependent latent variable. The presentation of the variation of the interaction effects across all predicted probability values is motivated by the Ai and Norton (2004) correction when interaction effects are present in non-linear estimation models.
Interaction effect of High AI dummy with S&P primary equity ranking (Table 3, Interaction effect of High AI dummy with S&P primary equity ranking (Table 3, regression  model 3) Interaction effect of Continuous AI with S&P primary equity ranking (Table 3, 
Panel A: Issuance Process
Announced before completion
Sold in the secondary market
Sold in increments Underwritten
ATMs
We find that 95.4% of ATMs programs are announced on (or after) the closing date of the commencement of the program. The dates of the securities' sale are not announced.
Through ATMs, newlyissued shares are sold to the secondary markets.
Yes Through ATMs, newly-issued shares are dribbled out into the trading market through a designated brokerdealer at prevailing market prices. There is a placement agent used that acts on a best efforts basis. In the rare case that the placement agent commits to purchase the issuer's securities for its own account with a view to reselling securities, he does not conduct any roadshows or other solicitations. The placement agent is still liable with respect to material misstatements or omissions in the accompanying shelf registration statement. Table 5 Dribble-out of ATM Shares Table 5 presents univariate statistics on firms' actual issuance behavior of ATM offerings. Data are collected from firms' 10-Q filings (for the ending quarter of each fiscal year we use the 10-K filing). All variable definitions are in Appendix A. We also report two weighted average market prices built on what ATM issuers quote for their actual issuance activity. The first is the average market price ATM issuers capture adjusted by the end-of-quarter closing price. The second is the average market price ATM issuers capture adjusted by the average contemporaneous quarter's closing price. For these measures, we only consider the ATM issuances for which we have the weighted average market price documented in the issuer's 10-Q or 10-K, respectively. We report statistics for three samples: (Panel A) Table 6 Regressions Explaining Dribble-out Behavior Table 6 presents estimates from censored quantile regressions of the actual cumulative issuance (the total number of shares issued from start of program through this quarter, relative to the number of shares the firm announced it planned to issue in the original filing) on a set of explanatory variables for which the definitions are in Appendix A. The sample is all firm/quarters (899) with sufficient data to run the regression. In separate models, we focus on the following quantiles of the percentage actual issuance: 75 
